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Abstract
Since America’s foundation, women’s rights have expanded to lengths that would have been
unimaginable to the Founding Fathers including the right to vote, the ability to work outside the home,
and some aspects of bodily autonomy. These legal adaptations, along with a larger cultural shift towards
liberation, have left many modern-day women with a false sense of security in the face of growing
judicial sentiments that threaten the rights of women. The legal theory of originalism that has been
growing in force significantly since the 1980s argues that in interpreting constitutional matters, judges
should uncover and promote the meaning of the document at the time it was ratified.
This paper seeks to determine what implications the growth of originalism has for the future of
women’s rights. To undergo this analysis, the paper begins with a thorough explanation of originalism and
its variations as well as an explanation of originalist methodology. The project continues to explain how
the evolution of originalism has produced a more self-confident and activist version of the original theory.
The evaluation then turns to applying an originalist lens to issues of women’s rights theoretically and
evaluating the judicial records or originalist judges in practice. Finally, the paper concludes with an
analysis of the likely originalist impact on a current Supreme Court case. This analysis makes clear that
no matter what way the theory is presented, through the eyes of an originalist, there is little room for the
protection of women’s rights in the Constitution.

Key Words: Originalism, Women’s Rights, Supreme Court, Living Constitutionalism, Intentionalism,
Textualism
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Introduction
Since America’s foundation, women’s rights have expanded to positions unimaginable to the
Founding Fathers. Various waves of feminism throughout history have led to the evolution of a woman’s
role in society in both political and civil spheres. Women now enjoy the right to vote, the ability to work
outside of the home, and some aspects of bodily autonomy. These legal adaptations, along with a larger
cultural shift towards liberation, have left many modern-day women with a sense of security in their
position in the United States. They feel sure that they will continue to have access to things that are now
hardly controversial, like contraceptives. They feel secure in believing that if they wish to have a child,
fertility treatments will be available to them. Many women even feel secure in their right to safe abortion,
despite contentious debates over the topic, because they know vaguely of the protections established in
Roe v. Wade. However, this sense of security is false and rooted in ignorance of the growing judicial
sentiments that threaten the rights of women.
The judicial sentiment that poses one of the foremost threats to women’s rights, and that will be
the focus of this paper, is the theory of constitutional interpretation known broadly as originalism. The
misconception of security builds from a lack of understanding of what originalism is, how it has evolved
over time, and how its growing influence on the Supreme Court poses an immediate risk. Originalism is a
method of interpretation that legal scholars and judges use as a tool to apply the text and meaning of the
Constitution to contemporary issues. The theory has earned its name because rather than using an
evolving meaning of the Constitution, originalists claim that they uncover and apply the original meaning
of the text. This conceptualization of the Constitution’s text alone, however, is not what threatens
women’s rights. Rather, it is the evolution of originalist scholarship and jurisprudence that has built
originalism into an unrestrained and highly conservative tool for cutting back protections of women’s
rights.
This paper will begin by providing a detailed description of originalism and its variations. The
next section will proceed by following originalism through the eras and analyzing its evolution. Next, the
analysis will turn to a theoretical evaluation of originalism’s implications for women’s rights followed by
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an evaluation of the impacts of originalism on women’s rights in reality. The paper will conclude by
evaluating originalist sentiment in the most recent hearing surrounding women’s rights pending decision
before the Supreme Court. All of these components work together to demonstrate how originalism poses
an immense danger to the security of women’s rights in the United States.

Originalist Theory
The growing influence of originalist legal theory within the federal court system has
heightened the need to understand the fundamental principles of the theory and how it compares
to other prominent methods of judicial interpretation. Constitutional scholar Keith Whittington
(2004) describes originalism as a theory that “regards the discoverable meaning of the
Constitution at the time of its initial adoption as authoritative for purposes of constitutional
interpretation in the present” (p. 599). Under this definition, being an originalist is to interpret the
original text of the Constitution and its amendments to mean exactly what they meant at the time
each was ratified and apply that meaning to current legal debates.
Another way to understand originalist interpretation is the two core principles described
by originalist legal scholar Lawrence Solum. The first of these principles is what Solum (2017)
refers to as the “fixation thesis.” This is the idea that the meaning of constitutional text is set or
“fixed” at the point of ratification (p. 269). The second component is the “constraint principle”
which posits that as an originalist, you are entirely constrained to interpret the Constitution
according to that original meaning (p. 269). These principles outline the logical mechanism of
originalist academic and judicial arguments.
Originalist Methodology
The key to understanding how originalist judges and scholars utilize this logical
mechanism to reach decisions is to understand what original meaning is and how it is uncovered.
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Solum (2017) argues that the original meaning or “communicative content” of the text is the
“content that the drafter intended to convey to the audience at which the text was aimed” (p.
271). In other words, determining original meaning involves taking both the author’s intent and
the audience’s interpretation into account.
To reach these conclusions, originalists primarily use published texts and written records
of public debate to gain insight into the intentions of the Constitutional Framers and the
popularly understood meaning of the text. Solum divides these methods of interpretation into
semantics and pragmatics. To interpret semantic meaning from constitutional texts, Solum
suggests that originalists utilize their own linguistic intuitions as English speakers, definitions
from dictionaries published in a given time period, methods involving searchable linguistic data
sets known as corpus linguistics, and partial immersion through a wide variety of written texts
and records of spoken word (2017, p. 281-285).
In addition to determining the meaning of the text itself, Solum (2017) argues that proper
originalist analysis includes thorough investigation into the context in which a text was written
(p. 286). This aspect of the analysis involves historical research into the author’s intent and the
audience’s interpretation. For example, a pragmatics approach to the original text of the
Constitution would utilize information about the arguments of the Framers at the Constitutional
Convention and reports of public sentiment during the ratification process. All of these aspects of
originalist methodology come together to create the content referred to in the fixation thesis
which is then bound originalists via the constraint principle. Although all originalists share these
central principles, there are different variations based on this same theoretical foundation.
Originalist Variations
Intentionalism
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Arguably the original form of originalism, intentionalism holds that the Constitution is to
be interpreted as closely as possible to the intentions of the Framers. This variation of originalism
cares little for public meaning and instead stresses the intentions of the drafters above all else.
Originalist legal scholar Raoul Berger wrote, “I understand by original intention, the explanation
that draftsmen gave of what their words were designed to accomplish, what their words mean”
(1987-1988, p. 350-351). Under Berger’s form of constitutional interpretation, the best way to
determine the meaning of the text of the Constitution is to investigate what the Framers intended
it to mean. Berger argues that judges should give deference to the Founders because they were
the ones who initially conferred power to the judicial branch (1987-1988, p. 351).
Textualism
A second group of originalists falls into the category of original meaning or textualism.
Rather than rely on analysis of the intentions of the Framers, textualist originalists rely on the
actual meaning of the words in the document as well as what those words meant to the public at
the time of ratification. One of the most notable textualist originalists was Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia. In a speech detailing his style of constitutional interpretation (1996/2003),
Justice Scalia said:
You will never hear me refer to original intent, because as I say, I am first of all a
textualist, and secondly an originalist. If you are a textualist, you don’t care about the
intent, and I don’t care if the Framers of the Constitution had some secret meaning in
mind when they adopted its words. I take the words as they were promulgated to the
people of the United States, and what is the fairly understood meaning of those words…
The words are the law. I think that’s what is meant by government of laws, not of men.
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We are bound not by the intent of our legislators, but by the laws which they enacted,
laws which are set forth of words, of course. (para. 4)
There are many other variations of originalism that emphasize different
components of analysis but they all generally fall under these larger umbrellas of intentionalism
and textualism. Additionally, all of the notable originalist judges that will be discussed later in
this work can be categorized as either intentionalists or textualists. What is important to
remember is that although these originalist theories differ in the components they find most
critical to deciding constitutional matters, they all uphold the same central idea that the meaning
of each part of the Constitution was set long ago and continues to remain constant.
Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism
Perhaps the best way to understand originalism is to explain the opposing legal theory,
living constitutionalism. Just as the theory’s name suggests, living constitutionalists believe that
the meaning of the Constitution “lives” and can change throughout history with popular opinion
and judicial interpretation. Living constitutionalism operates under the idea that the Constitution
was intended to be this way and that the Framers actually wanted it to be flexible and evolve
with the times. This idea, they argue, is supported by documentation of the Framers’ intentions
including an 1816 letter where Thomas Jefferson wrote:
But I know also, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the
human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are
made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of
circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. We might as
well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society
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to remain ever under the regime of their barbarous ancestors. (The Jefferson Monticello,
n.d.)
This quote from Thomas Jefferson both explains the theoretical underpinnings of living
constitutionalism and shows how an argument can be made for the theory based on the Framer’s
wishes.
Additionally, this approach is argued to be the more pragmatic of the two because rather
than applying the meaning of a document that was established centuries ago to modern problems,
living constitutionalism supports the idea that the meaning of the text itself can change alongside
society. Just as with originalism, there are many varieties of living constitutionalism but they
share the central component of constitutional adaptation to the changing times.
The Evolution of Modern Originalism
First Wave
Although the version of originalism that is the subject of heated debate today gives
substantial weight to the intentions of the Founders and the public meaning of the Constitution at
the point of ratification, the modern incarnation of originalism does not have its roots in the 18th
century. Rather surprisingly, today’s originalism is a product of the latter half of the 20th century.
Even more astoundingly, today’s originalism, which is heavily cited as a tool for conservative
justices, began its development during a liberal era of the Supreme Court under the liberal
judicial icon, Justice Hugo Black.
In many ways, Justice Black perfectly fits the description of an ordinary modern
originalist. Primarily, Black believed that judges should restrain themselves and allow the
democratic processes of the government to be the agents of constitutional change. In his work
entitled A Tale of Two Textualists, in which he compares the interpretation styles of Justice Black
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and prominent originalist Justice Antonin Scalia, Michael Gerhardt (1996) writes that “they share
the view that an unrestrained judiciary bent on deciding cases as it pleases is a serious threat to
democratic government and to the sanctity of the written Constitution” (p. 28).
Furthermore, just as other textualist originalists argue, Black believed that the avenue for
protecting the country from undemocratic judicial activism was strict adherence to the text of the
Constitution. In his book describing his approach to constitutional interpretation, Justice Black
(1968) wrote that “it is the language and history that are the crucial factors which influence me in
interpreting the Constitution–not reasonableness or desirability as determined by justices of the
Supreme Court” (p. 8). These sentiments, while new for their time, fit in fairly well with the
commentary of the originalist justices who sit on the Supreme Court today. What makes this first
wave of originalism and Black’s specific approach to interpreting the Constitution so interesting
is the context in which they arose.
Justice Black’s version of originalism was created as his response to the Lochner era of
the Supreme Court. This period of Court’s history was fittingly named for the case Lochner v.
New York (1905) in which the conservative majority struck down a law that set a limit on
working hours supported by the belief that such a limit infringed upon the workers’ right to open
contracts and their overall liberty. This case is just one of many during this Supreme Court where
Progressive Era and New Deal policies were struck down because the justices saw them as
government overreach under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Upset at the
Court’s decisions to strike down the policies he championed, President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt seized the opportunity to appoint Black, a proponent of the New Deal, with the goal
that he would help to turn the tide in favor of the regulatory provisions.
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Speaking in 1967 directly about the reason behind his appointment, Black said “[t]hat’s
why I came on the Court… I was against using due process to force the views of judges on the
country” and continued to explain the drive behind his originalist views saying, “I wouldn’t trust
judges with that kind of power and the Founders did not trust them either” (“Justice Black Dies,”
1971). In other words, it was originalism in favor of the liberal New Deal agenda that landed
Black on the Court where he became the first “to frame originalism as a definitive constitutional
theory” and earned his reputation as the “inventor of originalism” (Feldman, 2010, p. 145). The
most substantial difference between the interpretation style of Justice Black and that of the two
more recent waves of originalist justices is that his interpretation of the Constitution advanced
the policy goals of a liberal agenda whereas more recently, originalists tend to form highly
conservative rulings.
Another important difference, especially between Black’s originalism and that of the
following wave, is the level of activism that Black exerted. Although Black heavily criticized the
judicial activism of the Lochner era, even going so far as to say it was dangerous for democracy,
his interpretation of the Constitution also included significant levels of activism. This activism
was due to Justice Black’s belief that originalism was absolute, leading him to “not hesitate to
vote down legislation that violated his understanding of the Constitution’s meaning” (Telman,
2016, p. 8).
One sign of judicial activism is overruling precedents. Because judges typically try to
defer to precedents to keep the doctrine of the courts stable, a lot of overruled precedents are a
sign that judges are more willing to overrule what previous courts have decided in order to
impose their own interpretation. Again writing to compare Justice Black with Justice Scalia,
Gerhard (1994) wrote, “no two justices in this century have called for overruling more precedents
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than Justice Black and Scalia. For example, no one on the Court during Justice Black’s
thirty-four years dissented more often or urged more overruling than he did” (p. 33). This clear
pattern of judicial activism displayed by Black is one major characteristic that separates the wave
of originalism for which he led the charge and the following wave that more seriously stressed
judicial restraint and deference to democratic processes.
Second Wave
The second wave of originalism, which scholars in the field refer to as “Old Originalism”
(Colby, 2011, p. 716), can be categorized by its reactionary birth, emphasis on judicial restraint,
and intentionalist nature. The Supreme Court during the 1950s and 1960s led by Chief Justice
Earl Warren is widely regarded to be the most liberal Court in history due to its major expansions
of civil rights and federal government authority. The Warren Court’s revolutionary decisions
enraged the country’s conservatives and left them searching for a way to combat liberal rulings.
President Richard Nixon argued that the solution to what he viewed as the judicial activism of
the Warren Court was strict adherence to the Constitution through an originalist approach. In
fact, criticizing the Warren Court and vowing to appoint originalist Supreme Court justices was
one of the strategies he utilized in his “law and order” focused campaign (Whittington, 2004, p.
599). While giving a campaign speech about Supreme Court vacancies, Nixon declared that the
judges he would appoint
would see themselves as interpreting the law, not making the law. They would see
themselves as caretakers of the Constitution and servants of the people, not
super-legislators with a free hand to impose their political and social viewpoints upon the
American system and the American People. (1968/2021)
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Whittington points out that Nixon was speaking “[i]n words that could have been lifted from
Franklin Roosevelt” and the way he spoke about the Court during the Lochner era (Whittington,
2004, p. 601).
There are two things that are important to note about Nixon’s promise to appoint
originalists. The first is that he was elected and went on to fulfill this promise in 1971 by
appointing William Rehnquist. Chief Justice Rehnquist was well aware of his purpose and
certainly steered the Court in a conservative direction with his originalist approach. The second,
and more critical thing to note, is the pattern of contextual similarities between Justice Black’s
and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s appointments. Both justices were appointed by presidents who
believed that the judges’ vision as originalists could direct the Court in a way that offered them a
political advantage. It is evident from this pattern that originalism is a useful political tool that
has historically been used to combat controversial Supreme Court decisions. Perfectly summing
up the birth and nature of “Old Originalism,” Whittington (2004) wrote:
originalism was a reactive theory motivated by substantive disagreement with the recent
and then-current actions of the Warren and Burger Courts; originalism was largely
developed as a mode of criticism of those actions. Above all, originalism was a way of
explaining what the Court had done wrong, and what it had done wrong in this context
was primarily to strike down government actions in the name of individual rights. (p.
601)
The similarities between the appointments of Justice Black and Chief Justice Rehnquist
demonstrate the reactive nature of originalist theory. However, it is critical to highlight that the
major distinction between these two waves is that during the second wave, originalism was being
used as a tool by conservatives.
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The second wave is also when originalism became known as a style of interpretation that
stressed the importance of judicial restraint. However, whether this was only a priority in
advocacy for the theory or in actual practice is up for debate. The idea of judicial restraint was a
response to what conservatives saw as an out-of-control liberal Warren Court making up policies
from the bench and forcing them on the American people. For advocates of “Old Originalism,”
judicial restraint was a top priority and seen as a necessity to protect democracy from rule by the
unelected judiciary. Whittington went so far as to say that originalist theory was “married to a
requirement of judicial deference to legislative majorities” and that “[t]he primary commitment”
of their advocacy was judicial restraint (Whittington, 2004, p. 602). This means that although
this wave of originalists did think that the Constitution had the possibility of being a “living”
document, they believed that this life had to flow from democracy and through the Article V
amendment procedures laid out in the Constitution. While advocates of originalism during this
time certainly touted the importance of judicial restraint, originalist judgments didn’t necessarily
follow this aspect of the doctrine. For instance, Justice Scalia was one of the most likely justices
to favor throwing out precedents, a sign of judicial activism (Gerhard, 1994, p. 33).
Another distinctive trait of second-wave originalism is its intentionalist interpretation
style. Colby (2011) explained that “[t]he Old Originalism entailed a commitment to the original
intent of the Framers. That is to say, in its early days, originalism was understood as a mandate to
interpret the Constitution to mean what the Framers intended it to mean” (Colby, 2011, p. 720).
Rather than interpreting the text using original meaning or public understanding, originalists at
this time broadly advocated for a Framers-focused approach and argued that their intent should
be a primary concern.
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This focus on intent is what Colby blames for the downfall of Old Originalism. Colby
argues that the intentionalism of the second wave was brought down not in the courtroom, but in
academia where the theory could not stand up to extensive scrutiny. Primarily, he proposes that
second-wave originalists could not produce a sufficient answer for the critique that it was
impossible to determine a single intent for all of the constitutional Framers. Colby continues to
say that “[t]hose outside of the movement buried it in a sea of devastating critiques–critiques that
it could not withstand, at least not without substantially reformulating itself in order to deflect
them” (Colby, 2011, p. 718).
On the other hand, Whittington proposes that the political rationale for the downfall of
“Old Originalism” is at least as important as the academic critiques. Whittington points out that
because the originalism of that era was designed to combat the liberal decisions of the Warren
and Burger Courts, the theory as it stood then had no purpose as the Court leaned more to the
right due to President Reagan’s appointees (Whittington, 2004, p. 603-604). Either way,
originalism did reformulate itself significantly into the version of the theory present in the third
and current wave.
Third Wave: New Originalism
Originalism, as it stands today, did not develop as a reaction to any particular era of the
Supreme Court or any specific decisions. Rather, New Originalism has formed into what it is
today by refining itself in order to grow in power and scope. As Whittington (2004) pointed out,
New Originalism is “more concerned with providing the basis for positive constructional
doctrine than the basis for subverting doctrine (p. 608). Scholar Jeremy Telman (2016) attributes
this growth in “self-confidence” to the continual rightward drift of the Supreme Court. Instead of
having to fight back liberal Supreme Court decisions, conservatives concerned with the Court
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realized that they could enhance originalism to both stand up better to academic scrutiny and to
have an overall wider reach.
This so-called confidence also resulted in several other substantial changes to originalism.
The first is that its devotion to the intent of the Framers, heavily criticized for its poor grasp of
reality, adapted to a devotion to original public meaning. In other words, New Originalism “is
focused less on the concrete intentions of individual drafters of constitutional text than on the
public meaning of the text that was adopted” (Whittington, 2004, p. 609). This distinction means
that the version of originalism popular today is much more similar to textualism than
intentionalism.
The process for utilizing this particular form of originalist textualism involves analyzing
the semantic meaning of the text, the constitutional implicature, and the available communicative
context (Barnett, 2013, p. 413-414). The purpose of this in-depth analysis of the text itself, as
proposed by self-declared New Originalist Randy Barnett (2013), is to “establish an empirical
fact about the objective meaning of the text at a particular point in time” (p. 415). The critical
component of this statement is the word “empirical” which signifies that New Originalists view
textualism as a fact-finding mission essential to their commitment to the original meaning of the
Constitution.
However, the intentions of the Framers are not totally lost in the third wave of
originalism. Instead of trying to perfectly gauge the intent of the Framers, New Originalists claim
to use the text itself to determine what the Framers sought to communicate. Whittington (2004)
points out that although New Originalists have not “reduced” the meaning of the Constitution to
the intentions of the Framers, they do generally believe that “[t]he scope of beliefs that particular
drafters might have had about the application (of constitutional principles)... may be useful to
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understanding what principle they actually intended to convey with their language” (p. 610). This
means that New Originalists are okay with using records of the Framers’ intentions to determine
what they desired to communicate through the text but that their intentions alone are not a
stand-in for the textual meaning.
Additionally, with this new development in the way originalists interpret the Constitution,
comes the necessary acknowledgment that not all questions can be clearly answered through
strict readings of the text. This is because although textualism can answer most questions of
ambiguity, where the text could have multiple meanings, it cannot completely solve issues of
vagueness, when the text is generally unclear (Barnett, 2013. P. 419). For this reason, New
Originalists are careful to make the distinction between constitutional interpretation and
constitutional construction. When judges interpret the Constitution they seek to determine the
meaning of a certain aspect of the document and apply that meaning to the question at hand.
When judges engage in constitutional construction, they create their own meaning using the
broad principles of the Constitution to address questions the text alone cannot. Declaring his
support for originalist constitutional construction, Barnett wrote that “the Framers and ratifiers of
the Constitution locked some things into their text, and delegated other matters to future
decision-makers (Barnett, 2013, p. 419). In this way, New Originalists seem to be okay with the
idea of a living Constitution on matters not addressed directly in the text.
This means that overall, originalist judges today have a lot more flexibility in the handling
of the Constitution than they did using Old Originalism. Colby (2011) described this newfound
flexibility, writing that the Constitution “now reads the most important rights-granting clauses at
broad levels of generality, thus affording judges substantial wiggle room in which to engage in
constitutional construction” (p. 747). Colby’s point in saying this was to argue that New
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Originalism could be used to form either liberal or conservative rulings, but this relationship has
yet to be explored fully.
The second significant shift made between the second and third waves of originalism is
the abandonment of the commitment to judicial restraint. Explaining the irony of this change,
Colby (2011) wrote that “[o]riginalism has gained scholarly respect at the expense of the very
promise that used to be its defining trait” (p. 745), and continued on to say that “[t]he Old
Originalism could not keep the promise of constraint” but that “[t]he New Originalism cannot
even make it” (p. 750). These statements encapsulate originalism’s dramatic shift from
condemning liberal judges for legislating from the bench and declaring that judicial activism
threatened democracy to becoming much more comfortable with the idea of an active judiciary.
Telman (2016) notes that “contemporary originalists at times embrace judicial activism” (p. 4)
and Whittington (2004) goes even further to say that “originalism may often require the active
exercise of the power of judicial review” (p. 609). This liberation from the shackles of judicial
restraint is due to the growing power of conservatives in the federal court system. Today,
conservative justices feel more confident in their activism because the only primary restraining
principle that remains is fidelity to the Constitution (Whittington, 2004, p. 609). This form of
originalism, the flexible and unrestrained New Originalism, is the theory whose effects on
women’s rights I will analyze in this paper.
Originalism Applied to Women’s Rights
The best way to analyze the possible impact of the increasing force of originalism on
women’s rights is to apply originalism’s various methodologies to issues of sex discrimination
and reproductive rights. To do this well, however, is difficult given different originalists’
preferences and due to originalism’s variations throughout history. In order for this section to be
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inclusive of many versions of originalism, it will include an analysis using the strategies of both
intentionalism and textualism. While these approaches do emphasize different aspects of
constitutional interpretation, it is clear throughout the evolution of originalism that the two
variations, even today, are very intertwined with one another. For this reason, the intentions of
the Framers, the original public meaning, and the text itself are all important factors in any
originalist interpretation. Additionally, it is critical to evaluate the original text of the
Constitution, the post-Civil War Amendments, and the 19th Amendment each separately as they
all have different framers, social context, and textual properties.
The Original Intent and Text
To begin with the Framers of the original text of the Constitution, it is no secret that they
did not think highly of political or civil rights for women. Putting simply the reality of the time,
Historian Mary Beth Norton (1988) said “women had no status in the Constitution of 1787” (p.
7). At this time, it was not just the right to vote or protection from gender-based discrimination
that women faced. Rather, they experienced complete exclusion from public life and a system of
coverture whereby married women’s property and legal status was under the control of her
husband.
This marginalized status was reflected in both the intentions of the Founding Fathers and
the text of the Constitution. John Adams, a central figure of the time period, although not present
at the Constitutional Convention, summarized the position of the leading men at this time in a
letter to his wife Abigail Adams. Abigail, in a 1776 letter, wrote to John pleading with him to
“[r]emember the Ladies” and to “be more generous and favorable to them” because “all Men
would be tyrants if they could.” John responded by dismissing Abigail’s concerns and expressing
the view “that men were already their wives’ subjects and would be the victims of petticoat
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despotism if they yielded any further” (Case, 2014, p. 438). This sentiment reflects the common
theme that women at this time while holding a prominent role in the household, were not meant
for life in the public sphere and therefore, were not in need of any rights or protections in the
Constitution.
There are many likely reasons for this belief, but one of the most commonly attributed is
the Framers’ economic interests. Case (2014) points out that the Framers were “quite conscious
of their interests in preserving their male prerogatives in law,” including the monetary benefits of
retaining all of their wives’ property (p. 431-432). Another reason for women’s exclusion from
the Constitution is argued to be their role in the household. Norton (1988) writes that “[s]ince
married women and their daughters were legally subordinate to husbands and fathers and were
perceived solely as parts of households, it is therefore hardly surprising that they were ignored by
the drafters of the Constitution” (p. 8). Regardless of what their underlying justification was, it is
clear that the Framers did not intend for the eventual inclusion of women under the rights and
protections of the Constitution. As Case (2014) put it, “they did not simply forget about the
ladies; they specifically and intentionally determined to exclude them and to confirm men’s
tyrannical power” (p. 432).
Furthermore, the text of the Constitution, while at surface-level may seem to be written in
a broad and expansive manner, never actually specifying a gender for application, had quite a
limited scope. The Framers felt comfortable using such broad language, referring to “people”
rather than men exclusively because it was such a “firmly embedded assumption” (Hasday, 2013,
p. 4) in society at this time that men and women did not have equal rights and that women were
not to participate in government directly. Norton describes this phenomenon, saying that the
Framers comfortably “used ‘person’ rather than ‘man’ in Philadelphia in 1787” because:
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[t]o men of the late eighteenth century, the world of politics was so clearly exclusively
male that masculine defining terms were unnecessary. It never even crossed their minds
that women might want to be included in politics, or that ‘women’s rights’ might
eventually become an issue. (p. 14-15)
While it may seem contradictory, their reliance on these broad terms, when put into the context
of society at the time, shows that the Framers of the Constitution, neither in intention nor in text,
included provisions covering women in the document. This is the reality that originalist analysis
uncovers.
An originalist arguing that the theory does not hold contemporary society to these
ancestral expectations would say that the text of the Constitution has been updated via the
democratic process through things like the 14th and 19th Amendments. And this aspect of their
argument would be true. Amendments and Supreme Court interpretations of the main body of the
Constitution have extended its provisions to women. However, I maintain that this profound
exclusion of half the population maintains certain ramifications when using an originalist lens
that prioritizes original meaning.
This is primarily because of the fact that women started from behind impacts women’s
political and civil rights today. Because women have had to fight for inclusion in the provisions
of the original text and, as will be discussed later, the 14th Amendment, women have had to
expend significant political and social capital just to gain rights white men were granted from the
beginning. To put it more comprehensively, Case (2014) wrote:
Given the historical exclusion of women… from decisionmaking in the Republic, to
require them, at the moment of their inclusion, to expend energy and political capital on
effecting legislative repeal or constitutional amendment of every aspect of the legal
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system that is already stacked against them is to perpetuate their disadvantage when
compared to those whose interests have already been taken into account because they
could and did participate fully in the framing of the system (p. 453).
This means that because originalism maintains that the Constitution cannot be changed by
judicial interpretation spurred by changing societal standards, originalists say that women have to
secure changes through the democratic process despite their immense disadvantage from the
beginning. For the most part, this grueling process has already been completed. However, when
current decisions and rulings are made “without taking any account of women’s specifically
intended historical exclusion and its lingering after effects” (Case, 2014, 433) originalists
maintain their adherence to the original meaning of the Constitution in the worst possible way.
The Post-Civil War Amendments Intent and Text
Much of the legal protection given to women is rooted in the post-Civil War
Amendments, despite the clear intent of the framers of these amendments to prohibit their
application to women and their efforts through the text to convey this goal. While the basis for
most legal decisions in cases of sex discrimination is the 14th Amendment, many advocates were
hopeful that the 13th Amendment might also provide protection. Particularly, some believed that
a reading of the 13th Amendment prohibited the system of coverture present in the United States
at this time. However, it is evident in the legislative record that the framers specifically intended
the Amendment to exclude women. For example, Senator Edgar Cowan explained why he
advocated for a limited 13th Amendment, saying that it “was simply made to liberate the negro
slave from his master” and continued to say that “certainly” no one would say that the
Amendment could prevent the “quasi servitude which the wife to some extent owes her husband”
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(Case, 2014, p. 441). Limited additional effort to utilize a more expansive interpretation of the
13th Amendment was undertaken.
On the other hand, the debate over the application of the 14th Amendment is expansive
and divisive. Currently, precedent involving women’s rights primarily relies on the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Amendment. Respectively, these provisions require that no
state may “deprive any person of life liberty, or property, without due process of the law” or
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” While today there
are significant pieces of scholarship and many legal decisions declaring the application of these
principles to women’s rights, an originalist would likely find that neither the intent of those who
proposed and ratified the Amendment nor the text of the Amendment itself guarantees such
protection.
An investigation into the legislative history shows that although the 14th Amendment and
the other post-Civil War Amendments were intended to revolutionize the original text of the
Constitution, the changes were not so radical that they were originally intended to apply to
women. Scholars remark that “[c]ongressmen on all sides of the debates over the 14th
Amendment hoped that the Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause would not be read to disrupt
common law coverture or prohibit sex discrimination (Hasday, 2013, p. 5) and that “[t]he
Amendment was understood not to disturb the prevailing regime of state laws imposing very
substantial legal disabilities on women, particularly married women (Farnsworht, 2000, p. 1230).
The congressmen gave various supporting arguments for this exclusion, but the prevailing
idea was that such protection for women was counterintuitive to the concept of natural rights. For
example, legislators would argue that “the legal status of women, like the legal status of children,
was an obvious implied exception to the 14th Amendment’s ostensible guarantee of certain rights
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for all citizens” (Farnsworth, 2000, p. 1230). This appeal to natural rights is based on the
prevailing understanding at the time that women were simply so inferior to men when it came to
public life that such a declaration of rights could certainly not extend to them.
Another common argument, similar to that made by the original Framers, was that
women required no legal protection from the Constitution because they were only considered as
members of a household under the protection of men. This was an intentional strategy to prevent
the immediate inclusion of women in the 14th Amendment. Farnsworth (2000) noted that,
although the Reconstruction Congress utilized the sentiment that government should be grounded
in the consent of the governed, legislators were able to avoid women in this idea by “focusing on
the family” to provide “an expedient distinction between race and sex” (p. 1241-1242). These
understandings of the 14th Amendment represent both the intent of the legislators and the greater
original public meaning.
From an originalist perspective, a textualist reading of the 14th Amendment also does not
offer much, if any, protection for women. The most obvious reason for this gap in the
Amendment is because the second section is the first place in the Constitution in which the word
“male” was explicitly included (Hasday, 2013, p. 5). The text specifies that,
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the
executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion,
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or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such state.
This specificity demonstrates two things. The first is the success of the women’s movement in the
country. Through their advocacy for full citizenship rights and inclusion in the post-Civil War
Amendments, the women’s movement forced the hand of the Reconstruction Congress to make
any exclusion of women explicit, or else they would secure it for themselves. Hasday (2013)
wrote:
Just two decades after the Seneca Falls Convention, the women’s rights movement and its
claims could not be ignored, even in the Constitution. The drafters of the 14th
Amendment realized that if they did not use sex-specific language in the 14th
Amendment’s second section, then women would immediately contend that they had
been enfranchised and that women might even win such arguments. (p. 6)
Second, it communicated to the public that although much of the Amendment spoke in broad
terms, its application was limited to men. No originalist, not one that relies on the intent of the
legislators, the text of the document itself, or the original public meaning can ignore the explicit
exclusion of women displayed in the 14th Amendment.
It is important now to take a brief detour to explain how, despite originalist analysis of the
14th Amendment, it has come to be the primary protection for women’s rights. Hasday (2013)
describes this evolution from original intent as the result of the women’s movement “inspiring
and pushing the Supreme Court to enforce constitutional protections against sex discrimination
after decades in which the Court tolerated, endorsed, and reinforced the legalized subordination
of women to men” (p. 7). Any originalist who contends otherwise, making an argument that upon
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ratification the 14th Amendment provided protection for women, might take pause at the fact that
it took the Supreme Court 103 years, until the case Reed v. Reed, to make such a conclusion
themselves (Hasday, 2013, p. 10). This delay in the application is certainly a sign that such an
expansion fits neither the original intentions of the ratifiers of the original public meaning.
Rather, such an application, as put by Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (1979), was
the result of “[b]oldly dynamic interpretation, departing radically from the original
understanding” which was necessary to make “the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause a
command that government treat men and women as individuals equal in rights responsibilities,
and opportunities” (p. 16). This analysis makes it abundantly clear that an originalist
interpretation of the post-Civil War amendments, unless departing significantly from textbook
strategies of originalist analysis, provides no basis for the inclusion of women in the provisions.
The 19th Amendment Intent and Text
The 19th Amendment, while not commonly connected with sex-discrimination
jurisprudence in contemporary cases, has important implications for women’s rights as a whole.
The text of the 19th Amendment contains the first and only explicit protection of women in the
Constitution. The primary provision of the Amendment is quite explicit and not widely debated.
Generally, it is understood as a “guarantee of women’s right to vote” (Delahunty & Yoo, 2015, p.
1083). Originalists take no issue with this guarantee as the original meaning, but any additional
interpretations of the Amendment are not as secure.
While many scholars and judges believe that the text of the 19th Amendment additionally
extends other political rights to women, such as the right to run for office and serve on juries, an
originalist might be less sure of this interpretation. This is because the Supreme Court’s current
doctrine extending these other political rights that are not directly specified rests on a
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“synthesizing interpretation” (Siegel, 2020, p. 257). This approach combines the 14th
Amendment’s civil rights protections and the 19th Amendment’s political rights protections to
provide a “firmer constitutional foundation for modern constitution sex discrimination doctrine
more generally” (Seigel, 2020, p. 257). The issue with this synthesized approach from an
originalist perspective is that the 14th Amendment was never meant to protect women and,
therefore, cannot be used to bolster the 19th Amendment’s narrow voting rights guarantee. For
this reason, if an originalist were to take a very strict approach based on text alone, political
rights outside the right to vote might not be as protected as they are under the Supreme Court’s
current doctrine.
Originalist interpretation of the 19th Amendment becomes more complicated when you
consider both the original public meaning and the intent of the legislators. Some scholars argue
that the original public meaning of the 19th Amendment was that the addition essentially served
as an equal rights amendment prohibiting sex discrimination of any kind, not just in the voting
booth. In fact, some courts interpreted the text to mean just that. For example, in the Supreme
Court case Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, the majority “struck down a minimum wage law that
applied to women but not men,” in part on the grounds that it was sex discrimination under the
19th Amendment (Hasday, 2013, p. 7-8). Justice Sutherland writing for the Court declared that:
In view of the great–not to say revolutionary–changes which have taken place… in the
contractual, political, and civil status of women, culminating in the Nineteenth
Amendment, it is not unreasonable to say that these differences have now come almost, if
not quite, to the vanishing point. (Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 1923)
This interpretation is likely partially informed by the belief that the women’s movement had in its
potential to revolutionize women’s place in society. Hasday (2013) wrote that the judicial
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system’s initial view of the Amendment was “unsurprising” due to “how much the campaigns for
and against women’s suffrage focused on the impact that enfranchisement would have on
women’s roles in the family and the economy, as well as in political life” (p. 8). However, this
interpretation of the 19th Amendment was short-lived, and neither originalists nor other judges
tend to utilize the 19th Amendment this way.
The original public meaning of the 19th Amendment also corresponds with the intent of
those who wrote it. The Amendment, written by leaders of the women’s movement, was intended
to bring women wholly under the protection of the Constitution. Scholar Jennifer K. Brown
(1993) wrote that there was “no doubt its citizen framers intended such a result” because “[t]hey
saw suffrage as a symbol of women’s legal and political equality” (p. 2181-2182). Because
evidence shows that both the original public meaning and the intent of the framers of the 19th
Amendment entail a more comprehensive protection for women’s rights, it is possible for an
originalist who emphasizes these factors to make an argument that the Amendment does indeed
provide such protection. However, a historical basis upon which to make this argument
theoretically and an actual desire to do so by judges are two separate factors, as will become
evident in the following section of this paper.
No Room for Women’s Rights in Originalist Legal Theory
What becomes abundantly clear after looking at the Constitution through the eyes of an
originalist is that no matter what way you approach the theory, there is little to no room for
women’s rights in the United States’ most central legal document. Case (2014) wrote:
The broader conclusion one must reach after examining the history of the framing of both
the original Constitution and the post-Civil War Amendments is that no version of
original meaning–not the specific intent of the Framers, not the general understanding of
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the ratifiers, not the original public meaning, not the original expected application, not
any other version of what originalists may say they look at in order to determine the
scope of constitutional provisions hold much promise for yielding what Abigail Adams
demanded of John–a constitutionally mandated code of laws more “generous and
favorable” to women than the one the Framers inherited. (p. 445)
In fact, upon closer inspection, the only significant protection of women in the Constitution, as
seen by an originalist, is the 19th Amendment. In the words of Justice Bader Ginsburg (1979),
the Document is otherwise “an empty cupboard for sex equality claims” (p. 164).
In hindsight, this conclusion seems obvious given the time at which these components
were written, who they were primarily written by, and who they have been interpreted by. When
originalists look at the Constitution as they do, they systematically strip women of every judicial
victory they have made since their initial exclusion. Advertently or not, adhering to a theory of
constitutional interpretation that supports any original aspect of the Constitution, as it applies to
women, means supporting the original discriminatory purpose as well.
Originalism in Practice
In addition to the hypothetical implications of originalist theory, it is also critical to
evaluate how originalism affects women’s rights in reality. To undergo this evaluation, I will
analyze the statements and judicial records of the most influential self-declared originalist
judges. These judges are the actors who have transformed originalism from an abstract legal
theory to a full-fledged practice of constitutional interpretation with immediate consequences for
women’s rights. This analysis will proceed chronologically and will correspond with the three
waves of originalism described earlier in this paper.
Justice Hugo Black’s Originalism in Practice
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The story of originalism in practice begins with the “inventor of originalism,” (Feldman,
2010, p. 145) Supreme Court Justice Hugo Back. As previously discussed, Justice Black
advocated for originalism primarily because he believed that it provided protection for
constitutional rights and allowed for deference to democratically elected legislative bodies. The
key difference between Black and the originalists that followed him is that Black was a liberal
and typically ruled in line with this preference. However, when it came to women’s rights,
Justice Black’s originalism took priority over his liberal ideology.
This dynamic is evident in Black’s dissenting opinion in the landmark women’s rights
case, Griswold v. Connecticut. The case involved a dispute over a Connecticut law that
prohibited the use of any form of contraceptives, including their use by married couples
(Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). With a 7-2 majority, the Court ruled to strike down the law as
unconstitutional and in violation of the right to privacy that can be concluded from the 1st, 3rd,
4th, 9th, and 14th amendments (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). Justice William Douglas
reasoned that although the right to privacy is not directly found in the Constitution, “specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance” (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). Using these components
of the Constitution, the majority declared that various “zones of privacy” are free from
governmental control (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965). This case provided the right to
reproductive privacy only to married couples but it set the foundation for this protection to be
extended to single women in the 1972 case Eisenstadt v. Baird.
Justice Black explicitly declared that the law in question was “every bit as offensive”
(Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965) to him as it was to the justices in the majority but that he could
not agree with the way that the majority created “a composite constitutional right of privacy
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which did not have a concrete nexus with the literal text of any specific constitutional
prohibition” (Prickett, 1980, p. 790). Using his signature textualist approach, Justice Black could
find no such right to privacy in the Constitution. Scholar Morgan Prickett described his
approach, writing that “[f]or him, the determinative factors in constitutional interpretation were
the language used by the Constitution and the history behind the words” (Prickett, 1980, p. 791).
In summary, despite being one of the most notable liberal justices in history, Justice Black’s
adherence to originalism prohibited him from joining the majority in the creation of a right to
privacy in reproductive decisions. It is clear from Black’s strong dissent in Griswold that if the
Court would have been full of originalists like him, the path to legal and accessible
contraceptives would have been required to take a different direction.
Judge Robert Bork’s Originalism In Practice
Second-wave originalism was in full force under the Reagan Administration with the
nominations of Antonin Scalia and Robert Bork. With his Supreme Court nominees, Reagan
sought to appoint activist conservative judges who would reverse the Court’s pattern of rulings
under the liberal Warren Court. This is reflected in second-wave originalism’s tendencies to
prioritize the intentions of the Framers and emphasize judicial restraint. For the most part, Robert
Bork fit both of these characteristics. Although Bork was technically nominated to the Supreme
Court by President Reagan after Antonin Scalia, Bork advocated for and expanded originalism
prior to Scalia and for this reason, will be discussed first.
In 1987, Reagan nominated Robert Bork, a legal scholar and judge on the United States
Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia (Britannica, 2020). This nomination did not go as
smoothly as his previous appointments in part because Bork, although a relatively equal
proponent of originalism, was not as charismatic as Scalia and in part because Democrats in the
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Senate did not want a highly conservative judge to replace moderate Justice Lewis Powell
(Shapiro, 2020). The Senate Democrats were able to accomplish this goal because they had
gained eight seats in the midterm election of 1986 that took place between Scalia and Bork’s
nominations (Dionne, 1986). Bork’s nomination was ultimately defeated by the
Democrat-controlled Senate 58-42 but a lot of insight into originalist implications on women’s
rights can still be gained from the perspective of this foundational figure.
Judge Bork is considered the “original originalist” (Graber, 2012) and is credited for
popularizing and developing originalist legal scholarship. During a time when conservatives
were searching for viable methods to counteract liberal Warren and Burger Court decisions, Bork
was working as a law professor at Yale University and developing originalist theory. For his
work in this area, Bork was regarded as a “noted advocate for the doctrine of originalism”
(Britannica, 2020) and it is often argued that “[n]o one did more to make constitutional
originalism intellectually respectable” (Graber, 2012, para. 3).
While Bork’s theories are an important aspect of originalist-style jurisprudence, there is
one key factor that distinguishes Bork from the originalist justices like Clarence Thomas and
Scalia whose appointments to the Supreme Court were confirmed. In contrast to Thomas and
Scalia, who struck down more federal statutes than any other justices in history, Bork’s theories
were deeply rooted in judicial restraint. Graber (2012) wrote:
Judge Bork expressed only scorn for the few conservatives in the 1980s who suggested
that conservative justices should wield judicial power for conservative causes. His
originalism was primarily designed to limit judicial power, not change the direction of
judicial activism. (para. 7)
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Bork himself did not advocate for expansive judicial oversight, but the powerful tools he
developed laid the groundwork for an “instrument of unprecedented judicial activism” (Graber,
2012, para. 11) that would be utilized by many judges in the future. It is also important to note
that although he was not necessarily a proponent of judicial activism, his writings challenging
landmark women’s rights and civil rights cases signal that had he been confirmed, he might not
have been as restrained as he suggested.
Judge Bork’s originalist interpretation’s damaging effects are evident in his criticism of
Griswold v. Connecticut. In his essay “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems”
(1971), Judge Bork elaborates upon his originalist theory and sharply disagrees with the Supreme
Court’s Griswold decision. Bork’s primary disapproval is that he believes the ruling created a
right to privacy that was never a part of the Constitution as a way to adjudicate in favor of the
justices’ personal values. He wrote that Griswold was “an unprincipled decision, both in the way
in which it derives a new constitutional right and in the way that it defines that right” (Bork,
1971, p. 9). Judge Bork refers to Justice Douglas’ logic as “a miracle of transubstantiation”
through which he creates a right to privacy (Bork, 1971, p. 8). First, Douglas used the concept of
a penumbra of the amendments in the Bill of Rights to give them applicable meaning, and then
he used this penumbra of privacy and applied it to a case which Bork argued specifically
pertained to none of those amendments. Bork criticized the creation of an independent right to
privacy because Douglas “did not disclose… how a series of specified rights combined to create
a new and unspecified right” (Bork, 1971, p. 9). For this reason, he found the decision to be
biased and unprincipled and asserted instead that originalism would solve the logical mistakes
and provide a more neutral assessment of the law.
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From Bork’s perspective, if the Framers of the Bill of Rights did not clearly intend for a
right to privacy, it is not the Court’s place to extend that right even in the interest of the
protection or advancement of women. This interpretation of privacy severely limits the rights of
women and families in a wide scope of decisions such as contraceptives and abortion while
providing little to no additional path for the advancement of their rights.
Justice Antonin Scalia’s Originalism In Practice
Justice Scalia’s appointment to the Supreme Court in 1986 was successful and he
subsequently became arguably the most prominent originalist in history for his role in
popularizing the theory. Justice Scalia temporally fits best in the second wave of originalism but
his specific strategy of constitutional interpretation served as a transition from Old Originalism
to New Originalism. This is because although Scalia advocated for a restrained judiciary, he
himself was likely to advocate for overruling precedents. Additionally, unlike the second wave of
originalist scholarship which is primarily intentionalist in nature, Scalia was a self-declared
textualist originalist. Scalia “maintained he was a textualist” and that “in constitutional matters…
All that mattered were the words on the page (Totenberg 2016, para. 36). Importantly, in addition
to being an originalist, Justice Scalia was a “leading voice in uncompromising conservatism”
(Totenberg 2016, para. 1).
Due in part to his originalist views and likely in part to his conservative beliefs, Scalia
often dissented in cases involving the 14th Amendment’s application to women’s rights.
Furthermore, Scalia thought that because women constitute half of the electorate they “should
practice democracy rather than seek relief in constitutional litigation” (Robson, 2016, para. 4).
As previously discussed, this idea that women should be forced to secure their constitutional
rights through the democratic process rather than incorporation into the already existing
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protections places women’s rights in vulnerable territory. We can see this dynamic at play in
Scalia’s judicial record.
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992), the Court
evaluated a Pennsylvania law that required individuals to wait 24 hours before an abortion
procedure, required minors to gain the consent of their parents, and wives to get the consent of
their husbands in order to have an abortion. The Court ruled five to four to affirm Roe v. Wade
(1973) but did not invalidate most of the state provisions. The decision established that state
abortion regulations may not impose an “undue burden,” meaning a “substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability” (Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 1992).
However, Scalia and the other justices in the minority dissented and asserted that an
originalist lens and a focus on social tradition do not support the constitutional right to abortion
under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. The dissenting opinion read that “a
woman’s decision to abort her unborn child is not a constitutionally protected ‘liberty’ because
(1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of
American society have permitted it to be legally proscribed” (Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
1992). Justice Scalia saw the question at hand as to whether or not “the power of a woman to
abort her unborn child… is a liberty interest protected by the Constitution of the United States”
to which he firmly asserted it was not (Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1992).
His conclusion was established in his “specific methodology for defining rights under the
14th Amendment” (Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1992). This methodology, Scalia suggests,
finds that the only rights protected under the Due Process Clause are rights that have been
thoroughly established in the social culture and history of the United States. According to Scalia,
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the right to privacy in reproductive decisions is not one of these rights. At the time of the 14th
Amendment’s passage, many states had laws on the books restricting or prohibiting abortion, and
it is for this reason that Scalia claims that the Due Process Clause could not have possibly
included the right of women to have an abortion. Scalia also argued that his stance was not a
result of his personal beliefs but rather, that it was predetermined by the Constitution. Either way,
Scalia’s originalism acted as a legitimizing front for his argument to limit the right of women to
privacy in reproductive decisions.
This pattern is also present in United States v. Virginia (1996), where Justice Scalia
similarly argued against the expansion of women’s rights. This case was brought to the Supreme
Court following the Virginia Military Institute’s (VMI) continued refusal to admit women to the
school. The United States government filed suit against the state of Virginia on the grounds that
the exclusionary practice violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment (United
States v. Virginia, 1996). The state argued that the all-male school was an important aspect of
diverse educational environments across the state and that the rugged, competitive, and grueling
nature of VMI would not be accommodating to women. Instead, the state drafted a plan for the
Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL) designed to be a more appropriate military
education for women focused on improving self-esteem and developing leadership skills (The
Supreme Court Historical Society, 2020).
Writing for the majority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg rejected Virginia’s arguments and
countered that educational diversity was not the original reason women were denied access but
rather that institutions of higher education were considered too dangerous or difficult for women.
Additionally, Ginsburg argued that many women would be able to handle VMI’s intense
educational methods and that they should be given an equal opportunity to do so (The Supreme
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Court Historical Society, 2020). She wrote, “[w]omen seeking and fit for a VMI-quality
education, cannot be offered anything less, under the State’s obligation to afford them genuinely
equal protection” (U.S. v. Virginia, 1996). This case was a landmark victory for women’s rights
that effectively prohibited any law that "denies to women, simply because they are women, full
citizenship stature — equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to
society” (United States v. Virginia, 1996).
In a lone dissent, Scalia rejected the majority’s concept of this evolving equality in favor
of his own originalist interpretation. This interpretation included his belief that the Supreme
Court’s duty is to provide a clear precedent for the lower courts to use and distinct provisions to
guide legislation. For this reason, he thought the law was clear and stable and therefore not able
to evolve with changing conceptions of gender roles. Scalia thought that Ginsburg was
“[embarking] on a course of inscribing one after another of the current preferences of society
into our Basic Law” (United States. v. Virginia, 1996).
Scalia dissented partly on the basis that he thought the justices in the majority, despite
multiple of them being ideologically conservative and having similar political beliefs to Scalia,
were allowing these beliefs to cloud their judgment. He wrote that “the function of this Court is
to preserve our society’s values regarding (among other things) equal protection, not to revise
them” (United States. v. Virginia, 1996). While contradictory to his own judicial activist
tendencies, in the realm of women’s rights, Justice Scalia preferred to inscribe more rigid
interpretations of the law that did not allow for women’s rights to progress along with society. In
other words, if Scalia had gotten his way, his originalism would have prevented a critical
component of anti-sex discrimination jurisprudence.
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Additionally, of utmost importance to Scalia was the value of social and cultural
traditions. This notion goes hand in hand with his originalist interpretation, because seeing the
Constitution with its original meaning involves incorporating the common standards of life at the
time it was written. To Scalia, this meant a traditional structure of gender roles where men and
women operate in different spheres and have “differing developmental needs” (United States. v.
Virginia, 1996). These “generalizations of men and women allow him to draw a sharp and
distinct line between the two groups, which in turn allow him to argue the existence of different
spheres of activity appropriate to each group” (Gibson 2006, p. 160).
Even more important to note is the fact that in his eyes, Scalia was not inserting his
personal beliefs but rather patriotically preserving the intentions of the authors of the 14th
Amendment who, he argues, did not mean to include women under the Amendment’s protection.
In summary of his own beliefs, Scalia wrote, “whatever abstract tests we may choose to devise,
they cannot supersede, and indeed ought to be crafted so as to reflect, those constant and
unbroken national traditions that embody the people’s understanding of ambiguous constitutional
texts” (United States. v. Virginia, 1996). Scalia’s inclination towards originalism does not allow
for the expansion of women’s rights to fit an evolving culture but instead constrains women to an
antiquated and restricted role in society as the framers of the 14th Amendment saw them.
Justice Clarence Thomas’ Originalism in Practice
Justice Thomas, the current Supreme Court’s longest sitting member, was appointed in
1991 by President George H.W. Bush and brought with him the era of New Originalism. Justice
Thomas’ rocky relationship with women’s rights began during his confirmation hearing. His
hearing was overwhelmed by a leaked report of sexual harassment committed by Thomas
directed at his former employee Anita Hill. Hill testified to numerous instances of sexual
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harassment before the Senate and raised many questions about Thomas’ fitness to serve on the
Court and the treatment of women in the workplace overall (Tikkanen, n.d., para. 5). Despite
Hill’s testimony, Thomas was confirmed by the Senate. Although Thomas’ conduct and the
subsequent backlash have little direct relationship to his originalist method of constitutional
interpretation, the scandal surrounding his confirmation hearing accurately foreshadows how
Justice Thomas went on to approach women’s rights while on the Court.
In many ways, Justice Thomas’ originalism is an echo of predecessor Judge Robert Bork
(Smith, 1996, p. 50). Primarily, they are similar because they both emphasize an intentionalist
interpretation of constitutional text. Summarizing Thomas’ contributions to the Supreme Court
as of 1996, scholar Christopher E. Smith wrote that “Thomas’ opinions are replete with
references to the original intent of the Constitutional Framers” and that he used this analysis to
“form his conclusions about the Constitution’s true meaning” (p. 48). Furthermore, a passionate
admirer of Thomas’ approach, Kirk A. Kennedy (1997) declared that Thomas demonstrates a
“connectedness to both the mind and spirit of the Framers of the Constitution” (p. 33). In this
way, Thomas bears many similarities to the second wave of originalists.
Thomas’ interpretational signature that makes his methods distinct from all other
Supreme Court originalists before and after him is his devout advocacy of natural law which is
“at the core” of his approach (Allen Babcock et al., 1992, p. 140). Kennedy (1997) wrote that:
Classical natural law is a prescriptive system that recognized the existence of laws and
rights antecedent to the creation of the state. These immutable laws and rights can be
discovered by resorting to human reason and by examining the fundamental nature of
man and his environment. (p. 41)
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An essential point to make about this adherence to natural law is that to Thomas, it is not
supreme or secondary to his position as an originalist. Rather, in his eyes, natural law is a
requirement of his originalism and the two are therefore intertwined.
Thomas argues that the inherent requirement for adherence to natural law that comes with
originalism is rooted in the Declaration of Independence. Those who subscribe to this approach
argue that the appeal to natural rights in the Declaration was incorporated into the Constitution as
well due to the Framers’ “favorable inclinations towards natural rights” (Kennedy, 1997, p.
45-46). The problem with this approach is that natural rights have historically been invoked to
argue for limited women’s rights, including their exclusion from the 14th Amendment
(Farnsworth, 2000, p. 1230). However, natural rights are not always used for the wrong reasons.
In an article written by Allen Babcock et al. (1992), persuading the Senate Judiciary Committee
to not confirm Thomas, the authors described this complexity saying that it is a “slippery
concept” which has been used “in opposition to slavery, genocide, and torture” but also “to deny
women the right to vote or participate in public life” (p. 140). In this way, adherence to natural
law can be generally threatening to the rights of women.
More specifically, Thomas’ version of natural rights and originalism poses a major threat
to women’s right to privacy and freedom in reproductive decisions. This is because Thomas’
conception of natural rights requires that these rights belong to fetuses. Allen Babcock et al.
(1992) writes that “Thomas’ view of natural law is his enthusiastic endorsement of the assertion
that the fetus enjoys a constitutionally protected right to live from the moment of conception” (p.
140). This belief is not only a result of his belief in originalist interpretation but also his personal
religious beliefs (Allen Babcock, 1992, p. 140). In a 1987 speech given to the Heritage
Foundation, Thomas praised the work of Lewis Lehrman, which argues that adherence to natural
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law as the original intent of the Constitution would “require that abortion be defined as murder”
as well as “prohibit states from allowing abortion even where pregnancy resulted from rape or
incest or posed grave risk to a woman’s health” (Allen Babcock et al. 1992, p. 140). Even more
extreme is that this belief extends to the use of contraceptives or anything that is “viewed as an
interference with ‘natural’ human reproduction” (Allen Babcock et al., 1992, p. 141). Today,
such an extreme view would apply to commonly used medical procedures such as IVF.
Thomas’ view of natural rights as they apply to reproductive freedom demonstrates that
although Thomas praises judicial restraint and deference to democratic government, he is willing
to overrule long-standing precedents that interfere with his perspective. Even before his
appointment, Thomas helped to write a report by the White House Working Group of the Family
that called for the overturning of Roe v. Wade, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, and Eisenstadt v.
Baird (Allen Babcock et al. 1992, p. 141). This was also evident at the beginning of his time on
the bench. In 1996, Thomas was “in terms of assertiveness” among the most willing “to write
concurring and dissenting opinions stating his views” (Smith, p. 48).
Today, this clear pattern of advocacy continues. For example, in the 2016 case Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, which involved a Texas law that required abortion-providing
health facilities to comply with standards for surgical centers, Thomas argued against precedent
established in Roe. The majority ruled that these laws created an undue burden for women
seeking abortion care under Court precedent. Thomas, however, dissented and argued that the
Court used too high a level of scrutiny and that the petitioners did not demonstrate that closing
some clinics due to the heightened standards would actually affect the availability of care.
June Medical Services LLC v. Russo (2020) is another example of Thomas’s
unwillingness to protect women’s access to reproductive care. This case involved a Louisiana
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law that required all doctors who provide abortions to have admitting privileges at a nearby
hospital. In his dissent, Thomas wrote that Roe v. Wade (1973) “created the right to abortion out
of whole cloth, without a shred of support from the Constitution’s text.” The confidence and
willingness to overrule precedent that Thomas displayed in these cases and throughout his entire
career is the confidence and willingness that has defined the New Originalism of the third wave.
Justice Neil Gorsuch’s Originalism in Practice
The next originalist justice that fits into the third wave of originalism is current Supreme
Court Justice Neil Gorsuch, appointed in 2017 by President Donald Trump. Overall, Justice
Gorsuch’s originalism is seemingly more muted than Thomas’ and he has been less outspoken on
its application to women’s rights. However, Gorsuch’s originalism is still important to consider
because his current membership on the Supreme Court means that his interpretation has
significant and immediate consequences for women’s rights. Gorsuch is a textualist originalist
who demonstrates “an interest in, and enthusiasm for, searching historical inquiry” but may favor
“expanding the coverage of constitutional rights” more so than other originalists (Alderman &
Pickard, 2016-2017, p. 190).
The major distinguishing factor of Gorsuch’s interpretation is a higher level of
commitment to stare decisis. His record prior to his Supreme Court appointment indicates that he
“appears willing to favor stare decisis over textualism” more so than Scalia was inclined to do
(Alderman & Pickard, 2016-2017, p. 190). This is because Gorsuch has generally shown a
preference for doctrinal and social stability. Scholar Marc Spindelman (2021) argues that this
preference is evident in the recent Court decision Bostock v. Clayton County (2020) in which
Gorsuch wrote for the majority in declaring that Title VII employment protections extend to
LGBTQ+ individuals. Spindelman reasons that part of the reason Gorsuch sided with the liberal
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justices in this opinion was that he felt assured that the decision would not cause a “drastic
change or massive social upheaval” (Spindelman, 2021, p. 17). For this reason, Gorsuch’s
originalism appears to be a bit more restrained than the other third-wave originalists.
During Gorsuch’s time on the Court of Appeals, he showed a distinct preference for
religious freedom over reproductive rights. In two cases, Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius and Little
Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell, Judge Gorsuch aided in crafting opinions that “regarded the
question before the court as purely one of religious freedom” in cases questioning the validity of
the Affordable Care Act’s requirement that businesses provide contraceptive healthcare coverage
to female employees (Howe, 2017, para. 11). These decisions, while not decided on
constitutional grounds, show where Gorsuch’s priorities lie and indicate that “he is likely to join
the Court’s other more conservative members in being sympathetic to claims that a government
law or program violates the religious beliefs of an individual or a group” (Howe, 2017, para. 14).
How Justice Gorsuch’s originalism specifically applies to women’s rights is so far very
unclear because during his ten years on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit he never
“ruled on any cases directly involving abortion” (Howe, 2017, para. 2). And although the
Supreme Court has addressed abortion during his time on the Bench, he has thus far not used his
originalism explicitly as reasoning in his opinions on these cases. Overall, he does not seem to
favor protections for reproductive freedom. In the case June Medical Services v. Russo (2019),
Gorsuch wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that the majority should not have struck down a
restrictive Louisiana abortion law on several grounds. Primarily, in an originalist fashion,
Gorsuch argued that the Court erred by not deferring to legislative power. Gorsuch stressed this
point by arguing that this deference is especially important in cases involving highly
controversial issues like abortion. Gorsuch wrote that the Court overlooked the rules guiding
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judicial practice “in a case touching on one of the most controversial topics in contemporary
politics and law” where the Court “should be leaning most heavily on the rules of the judicial
process” (June Medical Services v. Russo, 2019). This dissent is the primary indicator that
Gorsuch’s originalism may not prove favorable to women’s reproductive freedom in the future.
Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s Originalism in Practice
The most recent judge to spark controversy about the merits of originalism is Supreme
Court Justice Amy Coney Barrett. On October 26, 2020, Barrett was sworn into the lifetime
appointment amidst a sea of debate over the legitimacy of confirming a Supreme Court justice so
close to the presidential election. Political opponents of President Trump and those who
disapprove of conservative judicial decisions also criticized Barrett for her originalist
interpretation style and history of favoring restricted women’s rights. During her confirmation
hearing, Barrett declined to specifically comment on her views on women’s issues like abortion
and in vitro fertilization (IVF) but continually emphasized her commitment to originalist legal
theory, including the influence of Justice Scalia on her interpretation (Fandos, 2020). Barrett,
when speaking of Scalia, said “[h]is judicial philosophy is mine too” but also stated that if she
were confirmed, “you would not be getting Justice Scalia, you would be getting Justice Barrett''
in her effort to convey that not all originalists come to the exact same conclusions (Biskupiak,
2020, para. 5-6). Barrett has a short judicial record, having only served on the 7th Circuit Court
of Appeals for less than three years, but her alignment with anti-abortion groups and writings
during her 15 years as a Notre Dame Law School professor provides insight into her originalist
perspective on women’s rights (Semones & Choi, 2020).
To examine how Barrett will decide cases of women’s rights, we can look at her
previously expressed views on contraceptives, IVF, and abortion. In 2012, Justice Barrett signed
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a letter entitled “Unacceptable” which harshly criticizes the Affordable Care Act’s
accommodation requirement which mandates that all employer-provided insurance plans,
regardless of whether or not the employer is a religiously centered entity, must include coverage
for contraceptives. The letter states:
The simple fact is that the Obama administration is compelling religious people and
institutions who are employers to purchase a health insurance contract that provides
abortion-inducing drugs, contraception, and sterilization. This is a grave violation of
religious freedom and cannot stand. (Garvey, et al., 2012, para. 5)
In opposition to Barrett’s appointment, several doctors wrote an article in the journal of Fertility
and Sterility commenting on Barrett’s anti-choice record. In summary, they wrote, “[w]e among
many believe that this nomination presents an undoing of Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s progress and an
enduring step backward for women’s individual liberty. These two principles of women’s
equality and reproductive choice are inexorably linked” (Niederberger et al., 2020, para. 5-6).
Notably, Justice Barrett has also publicly sided with organizations that oppose IVF. In
2006, Justice Barrett signed her name to a newspaper advertisement sponsored by St. Joseph
County Right to Life (now a part of Right to Life Michiana) which called for “an end to the
barbaric legacy of Roe v. Wade” (Liptak, 2020, para. 7). The director of Right to Life Michiana
has said of IVF, “[w]hether the embryos are implanted in the woman and then selectively
reduced or it’s done in a petri dish and then discarded, you’re still ending a new human life at
that point we do oppose that” and has even advocated for criminalizing doctors who dispose of
embryos collected during the procedure (Kirchgaessner, 2020, para.7). The doctors and editors of
Fertility and Sterility again oppose these views citing that “the majority of embryos created
through in-vitro fertilization in this country will not result in an ongoing pregnancy” and that
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discarding embryos with single-gene disorders is a common medical practice for the health of
mother and baby (Niederberger et al., 2020, para. 8). They wrote, “[t]he seating of Amy Coney
Barrett to the Supreme Court threatens those who seek to build a family” (Niederberger et al.,
2020, para. 11).
Barrett, who is a devout Catholic, has also openly spoken out against the legality of
abortion. During a lecture series at Notre Dame, “Barrett spoke both to her own conviction that
life begins at conception and to the ‘high price of pregnancy’” as she explained her beliefs
(Nagy, 2013, para. 14) . In Fertility and Sterility, Niederberger et al. (2020) stressed that Barrett’s
appointment is alarming due to her “public record of elevating her own personal beliefs
regarding human reproduction over science, a devastating threat to women’s liberty and
reproductive choice” (para. 7). All of these views, of course, are just part of Justice Barrett’s
religious and personal beliefs which she continually asserted during her confirmation hearings
would not affect her judicial rulings. However, it is a logical conclusion that these biases
combined with her originalist deference to traditional principles, would lead Barrett to rule
against women’s rights to contraceptives, fertility treatment, and abortion in many cases.
Justice Barrett has also written extensively on her opinions of stare decisis. This term is
Latin meaning “stand by things decided” and is intended to create doctrinal stability and
maintain the legitimacy of the judicial system by having general deference to the principles
established previously by the Court. This goes hand in hand with the idea of “super precedents''
which are important decisions that Supreme Court justices generally feel obligated to follow
despite their personal preference. In her essay “Precedent and Jurisprudence,” Barret (2013)
argues that strict stare decisis over controversial issues is used as an excuse to avoid ideological
and judicial disagreements between justices. Barrett (2013) writes:
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Rejection of a controversial precedent does not always mean that the case is wrong when
judged in its own lights; it sometimes means that the justices voting to reverse rejected
the interpretive premise of the case. In such cases, “error” is a stand-in for jurisprudential
disagreement. (p. 1711)
Barrett also goes on to say that originalists are obligated to ignore the idea of a super
precedent in cases that they determine to be in violation of the original intent of the Constitution
and adds that originalists Scalia and Thomas were very likely to do so. She wrote that “[i]t is
probably true that justices who subscribe to text-based theories are more likely than others to
encounter conflict between precedent and jurisprudential commitment” (Barrett, 2013, p. 1724).
Although she does acknowledge that originalists have a heightened commitment to overturning
some precedent, Barret also maintains that doctrinal changes are desired across the entire
spectrum of judicial preference.
Her opinions on stare decisis and super precedence have significant implications for
women’s rights. In her confirmation hearings, Barrett said that she does not consider Roe v. Wade
to be a super precedent because the issue remains highly controversial. She said that super
precedence is reserved for “cases that are so well settled that no political actors and no people
seriously push for their overruling. And I’m answering a lot of questions about Roe... which I
think indicates that Roe doesn’t fall in that category” (Naylor, 2020, para. 4). In the category of
access to safe abortions, Barrett’s originalist inclinations threaten women’s rights.
Through the evaluation of Justice Barrett and other prominent originalist judges’ records,
it is clear that the foundation and continuation of this legal theory leave little room for women’s
rights to be inscribed in judicial precedent. When judges put so much importance on the meaning
of the Founders or the original public meaning, they intentionally disregard those who were left
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out in the first place. Although women are integral to every aspect of American life, the rise of
originalist interpretation threatens to glue back together many glass ceilings women have broken.
Originalism in Today’s Abortion Jurisprudence
Abortion is the issue that has dominated the women’s rights debate for much of the last
two decades. The issue has come to a boiling point between women’s rights and pro-life
advocates in the case Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which is currently
awaiting a decision from the Supreme Court. With this case, the conservative justices on the
Supreme Court have the opportunity to overrule Roe and Casey by upholding a Mississippi
abortion law that would greatly alter the parameters of legal abortion care. Specifically, the
Mississippi law would ban all abortions performed after 15 weeks of pregnancy except in cases
of emergency or “a severe fetal abnormality” (Hassan, 2021, para. 5). This law directly defies the
standard set in Casey, which declared that abortion could not be banned prior to fetal viability,
which most experts determine to be at around 24 weeks (Hassan, 2021, para. 2021). To make the
situation more potent, “about one dozen Republican-controlled states already have so-called
trigger laws that would make abortion unlawful almost immediately” (Hassan, 2021, para. 27).
With three originalists justices sitting on the current Supreme Court and a powerful history of
originalist argument against abortion available to back up the other three conservative justices,
the Court seems to be in the perfect position to drastically alter the landscape of women’s
reproductive healthcare in the United States.
Many comments that Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Barrett made throughout the Dobbs
hearing demonstrate how their originalist interpretation colors their view of the arguments
underlying the case. First, Justice Thomas repeatedly asked the Solicitor General Elizabeth
Prelogar representing the women’s clinic to specify exactly where the right to abortion is located
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in the Constitution. The attorneys repeatedly asserted that it was inherent in the right to liberty,
but Justice Thomas continued. For example, he requested, “would you specifically tell
me–specifically state what the right is? Is it specifically abortion? Is it liberty? Is it autonomy? Is
it privacy?” (Dobbs v. Jackson, 2021). It is evident through this line of questioning that Justice
Thomas wanted Prelogar to concede that there was no right to abortion that could be found in the
Constitution, despite numerous previous Court rulings that conclude that right from the broader
context of the text.
Justice Thomas also attempted to emphasize state interest in regulating pregnancy from
conception by bringing up a case in which the Court ruled that a woman could be charged for
child neglect for using drugs even prior to fetal viability. Here, it is clear that Justice Thomas
values the interests of the government in regulating women’s reproductive care more than he
does the interests of women in actually receiving the care. Thomas appeared to be unmoved by
the counsel’s response that she was “not denying that the state has an interest here” and her
reiteration that “with all respects to this specific right to abortion, there are also profound liberty
interests of the woman on the other side of the scale” (Dobbs v. Jackson, 2021). Thomas
concluded his questioning by remarking that “if we were talking about the Second Amendment”
or “if we’re talking about the Fourth Amendment, '' he would “know exactly what we’re talking
about because it’s written” (Dobbs v. Jackson, 2021). I argue that Thomas’ refusal to
acknowledge the serious interest that women have in controlling their bodies and lives is a
symptom of his originalism. Because these interests were not acknowledged by the Framers of
the original Constitution or the authors of most amendments, Thomas refuses to give such
interests sincere consideration.
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Justice Gorsuch’s comments at the hearing were much more limited, but the opinion he
authored in June Medical Center was invoked by the Solicitor General Steve Stewart
representing the State. The attorney said that “[t]he lower courts are left not knowing what to
do… as just Gorsuch… emphasized in… June Medical, the problem for the lower court judges is
that the Constitution doesn’t give them an answer to this” (Dobbs v. Jackson, 2021). In other
words, Justice Gorsuch’s previous opinion was utilized by the attorney to make an originalist
appeal to the fact that the right to abortion is not clearly laid out in the Constitution but rather is
inferred from broader principles of the text.
The main concern for Justice Barrett during the hearing was how overruling Roe and
Casey would affect Court legitimacy and proper use of stare decisis. In this way, Barrett seemed
to work together with Stewart to make an argument for avoiding principles of stare decisis in this
case. The discussion began when Justice Barret said that “part of our stare decisis doctrine is that
it’s not an inexorable command and that there are some circumstances in which overruling is
possible” (Dobbs v. Jackson, 2021). That loaded statement led Stewart to a New-originalist-style
argument that overruling precedent is preferable and seemingly more legitimate in some cases
than principles of stare decisis. Stewart said that some of the Supreme Court’s greatest rulings
have been those overruling precedent and said of Casey that “[i]t was wrong the day it was
decided. We know it’s wrong today. And it’s led to all these terrible consequences. We should–
we should get rid of it” (Dobbs v. Jackson, 2021). This exchange was part of the larger sentiment
that although overruling landmark cases like Roe and Casey may majorly damage Court
legitimacy in the public eye, changing Court doctrine in order to adhere to originalism is more
important. When the Supreme Court releases its decision in the Dobbs case, it is highly likely

50
that it will be in part based on an originalist argument minimizing the importance of stare decisis
and emphasizing the original meaning of the Constitution.
Conclusion
After a thorough evaluation of what originalism is as well as how it operates in theory
and in practice, it is abundantly clear that its growing influence on the Supreme Court puts
women’s rights at risk. Originalism’s evolution through the eras shows that the theory is no
longer an example of judicial restraint or deference to elected government. Instead, today’s
originalism is confident and forceful. As the judicial record shows, justices are more and more
willing to yield significant power in the name of originalism even if it is in conflict with the most
basic of women’s rights. This of course is problematic, because although the theory’s claim to
original intent and meaning may seem honorable, there is no avoiding the fact that the text to
which they promise to strictly adhere has excluded women in many different ways throughout
history.
The first step in changing the tide is to recognize the fragility of women’s rights in the
United States. Due to judicial precedent and changing societal conditions, many American
women continue to feel secure in their place in society and the rights afforded to them by the
Constitution. However, vigilance and commitment to continual progress are essential to limit the
impact of originalism’s efforts to turn back time on women’s rights.
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